Source: Omaha World Herald; April 3, 2001

Favoring Fetal-Cell Use Is Plainly Not Pro-Life
by Stephen E. Doran, M.D.

[Pro-Life Infonet Note: Stephen E. Doran, M.D. is an Omaha, Nebraska
neurosurgeon.]

As a practicing neurosurgeon and member of the clinical faculty at the
University of Nebraska Medical Center, I have treated individuals with
neurodegenerative disorders such as Parkinson's disease. I have also
published laboratory research investigating strategies in gene therapy for
neurodegenerative disorders. These diseases slowly and mercilessly destroy
the lives of affected individuals as well as their families. I would
rejoice at any insight into these disorders, as long as this information
is obtained in a morally acceptable fashion.

If an individual believes that abortion is a morally acceptable action,
then there is no argument that can persuade him or her that research using
fetal tissue from induced abortion is morally wrong. However, a large
number of Nebraskans believe that abortion is a morally reprehensible
action and as such believe that publicly funded institutions should not
use taxpayer revenue to support immoral research. No argument would
persuade them to think otherwise.

Yet, there are individuals, some of whom are state legislators, who
consider themselves "pro-life" - i.e., against abortion - yet feel that
they can in good conscience support research that uses fetal remains from
induced abortion.

The goal of this commentary is to build a solid, rational argument that
dispels the notion that one can be "pro-life" and simultaneously support
what is immoral research.

Opponents of Legislative Bill 462 believe that the research using fetal
tissue from induced abortion is morally distinct from abortion itself.
They argue (without solid evidence) that using fetal remains from induced
abortion would not result in a greater number of abortions and, therefore,
that the two actions are not morally linked.

This could not be further from the truth as demonstrated by the ethical
principle of "moral complicity." If a scientist uses fetal cells from
induced abortion, it places him or her in moral complicity with the
abortionist. That is, the scientist becomes an accomplice to the action
of abortion. This type of research requires an ongoing collaboration with
the practice of abortion. The scientist and the abortionist must interact
in a premeditated, substantial fashion in order for the research to be a
success. The tissues must be either delivered immediately or prepared in a
fashion compatible with the design of the experiment. In either situation,
as outlined in LB 462, an unavoidable entanglement with abortion providers
occurs.

Opponents of LB 462 argue that the fetal remains would otherwise be
discarded and as such it is a "nobler" end for them to be used for
research purposes. This argument can be refuted on the basis of "informed
consent." In almost all cultures, human remains are treated with
deference, and to use them without consent for research purposes would
violate this tradition of respect.

Who, then, has the right to consent to use this tissue_ The intuitive
response is that the mother has the right to consent because the unborn
child is merely a part of her body, much like her blood, skin or internal
organs. The flaw in this claim is that although the tissue is from within
her body, it is the body of another, with a distinct genotype, blood,
gender, etc.

The alternative response would then be that either parent, acting as the
child's guardian, could give consent. However, once the parents have
decided to destroy the unborn child, they implicitly abandon their role as
guardian. One cannot presume to act in a child's best interest and
simultaneously plot his or her destruction.

It has also been suggested that using fetal tissue from induced abortions
is morally identical to organ donation from victims of auto accidents.
This analogy fails to take into account the clear difference between
intentional and accidental death.

Others have suggested that using tissue from aborted fetuses is analogous
to organ transplantation from a homicide victim. Here the death is also
intentional. However, in the case of the homicide victim, the person
giving consent for donation is not the person responsible for the death.

Finally, opponents of LB 462 argue that such legislation would impede the
university's ability to attract talented scientists and that research in
neurodegenerative disorders would come to a halt. There is no evidence to
support this. In fact, the true "cutting-edge" research being done now
uses adult stem cells as a source for tissue. Adult stem cells are
primitive cells found in mature tissues, such as bone marrow or even the
brain itself. These cells can be harvested from a living individual and
then stimulated in tissue culture to transform into more specialized
cells, which then could be used for research or even therapeutic purposes.
While this technique is still in the early phases of development, it is
exceptionally promising and, equally important, is morally acceptable.

It is clear, then, that one cannot claim to be both "pro-life" and
simultaneously support research using fetal remains derived from induced
abortion. The ethical principles of moral complicity and informed consent
refute this, and the scientific promise of adult stem cells make such
research unnecessary.